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Abstract
The plaintiff in Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Wilkerson1
sustained injuries when he fell into a hole located on the premises
of Gulfstream Land & Development Corporation. His employer was
Gulfstream Utilities Corporation, the wholly owned subsidiary of Gulfstream
Land & Development Corporation.
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Introduction
The plaintiff in Gulfstream Land & Development Corp. v. Wilker-
son1 sustained injuries when he fell into a hole located on the premises
of Gulfstream Land & Development Corporation. His employer was
Gulfstream Utilities Corporation, the wholly owned subsidiary of Gulf-
stream Land & Development Corporation. Following his accident, Wil-
kerson received worker's compensation benefits from his employer,
Gulfstream Utilities. In Wilkerson, the plaintiff was suing the parent
corporation, Gulfstream Land & Development, for owner's negligence
in failing to maintain a safe premises. Wilkerson sought to recover for
his personal injuries plus damages for loss of consortium. The parent
corporation moved for summary judgment claiming immunity from the
independent tort action because its subsidiary had already paid com-
pensation benefits to Wilkerson. The parent and subsidiary corporations
maintained a joint worker's compensation insurance policy and the par-
ent corporation maintained that it should be immune from a tort action
resulting from the same injury that the worker's compensation insur-
ance had already paid benefits for. The Broward County Circuit Court
granted the parent corporation's motion for summary judgment but
Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's
decision, and the Florida Supreme Court followed the District Court's
decision.
This case comment will explore the various issues raised by the
Wilkerson decision which allowed a worker employed by a subsidiary
corporation to maintain an independent tort action against the parent
corporation. First, the focus will be on the background surrounding em-
1. 402 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 420 So. 2d 587 (1982).
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ployer immunity in exchange for worker's compensation and will ex-
amine the trend of other jurisdictions' refusal to extend immunity to
parent corporations. This will be followed by an analysis and compari-
son of the conflicting Goldberg v. Contex Industries Inc.' decision ren-
dered by Florida's Third District Court of Appeal which extended im-
munity to the parent corporation.
As in Wilkerson, the plaintiff in Goldberg was an employee of the
subsidiary corporation who slipped and fell while working on the prem-
ises of the parent corporation. Similar to the facts of Wilkerson, the
injured employee in Goldberg collected worker's compensation benefits
from a policy under which both the parent and subsidiary corporations
were jointly insured.3 In each case, the employee then sued the parent
corporation for negligence in maintaining the premises. The parent cor-
porations in both Goldberg and Wilkerson contended that they volunta-
rily assumed the burden of carrying worker's compensation and were
therefore protected from common law liability. The final focus of this
comment will attempt to set forth guidelines a Florida court might use
in rendering future decisions on this subject.
History of the Enactment of the Workmen's Compensation
Act 4
Wilkerson cites Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 5 a 1979 United
States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision based on Kentucky law.
Boggs exemplifies the modern trend of refusing to extend immunity
from tort action to parent corporations in worker's compensation cases.
In Boggs, fifteen coal miners who worked for a subsidiary corpora-
tion were killed when methane gas exploded in the mine. The coal min-
ers' widows brought an action for negligence against the parent corpo-
ration, Blue Diamond, because the parent corporation had the primary
responsibility for "mine safety functions," and because it was aware of
2. 362 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 370 So. 2d 459
(Fla. 1979).
3. Brief for Appellants, Wilkerson, 402 So. 2d 550; Brief for Appellants,
Goldberg, 362 So. 2d 974.
4. The Workmen's Compensation Law has been revised to read "Workers' Com-
pensation Law." It may be referred to either way within this paper.
5. 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979).
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the dangerous situation. Boggs raised a question of first impression.
The court, in order to reach its decision, looked to the language of the
Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act, its history and purpose, as
well as the general concepts upon which worker's compensation laws
were legislated. The adoption of worker's compensation laws served to
provide benefits in order "to compensate victims of industrial accidents
because it was widely believed that the limited rights of recovery avail-
able under the common law at the turn of the century were inadequate
to protect [workers]. '"" With the turn of the century, the employer de-
fenses of assumption of the risk, contributory negligence and the fellow
servant rule, resulted in workers recovering compensation for less than
a quarter of the work related accidents. Thus, rapid industrial and eco-
nomic growth were permitted at the expense of the injured worker.7
As a result of the injustices that occurred, worker's compensation
laws were enacted so that employees would be able to receive compen-
sation for injuries and employers would be able to sustain that burden
in a equitable manner. The Workmen's Compensation Act created an
exchange of rights between the employer and his employee. The em-
ployer received immunity from possible common law tort action by his
employee in exchange for accepting limited liability, i.e., payment of
insurance premiums. The employee obtained prompt relief by relin-
quishing his tort remedies against his employer in exchange for
worker's compensation benefits. Even though worker's compensation
has remedied many of the injustices that occurred at the turn of the
century, the benefits have remained relatively low. "[In recent years
serious questions have been raised concerning the fairness and ade-
quacy of present [w]orkmen's [c]ompensation laws in the light of...
new risks to health and safety, and increases in the general level of
wages and the cost of living." 8 Kentucky courts have responded to this
concern by liberally construing the employee coverage provisions of the
act and narrowly construing the employer immunity provisions.9 It ap-
6. Id. at 658.
7. W. PROSSER & J. WADE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 619 (5th ed.
1971); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 80 (1971). See also M.
HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 251-66 (1977).
8. Boggs, 590 F.2d 655, 659 n.5.
9. See Bright v. Reynolds Metals Co., 490 S.W.2d 474 (Ky. 1973); Peters v.
Radcliff Ready Mix, Inc., 412 S.W.2d 854 (Ky. 1967); Cove Fork Coal Co. v. New-
6511Employee Tort Actions
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pears that in Boggs the trend once again, is to protect the worker from
being neglected in the momentum of economic and technological
advances.
The Boggs court referred to Professor Larson's theory in determin-
ing that the Kentucky Workmen's Compensation Act does not extend
tort immunity to a parent corporation for injuries sustained by subsidi-
ary employees. Professor Arthur Larson's theory states: "[T]here is no
strong reason of compensation policy for destroying common law rights
• ..[and] every presumption should be on the side of preserving those
rights, once basic compensation protection has been assured. . ..",0
When appraising the question of a parent corporation's immunity
from tort liability for injuries to its subsidiary's employees, one cannot
"ignore the development of modern business conglomerates"11 that own
numerous and diversified enterprises.1 2 "Workmen's compensation laws
were passed before the multi-unit enterprise became the norm in the
American economy"13 and therefore do not address themselves to the
question of parent corporation tort immunity.
The employee should not have to relinquish his common law right
to sue in tort merely because the parent and subsidiary corporation
maintain a joint worker's compensation insurance policy. The parent-
subsidiary corporate relationship should not take precedence over the
employer-employee relationship from which the grant of employer im-
munity has evolved.1 4 Where the parent corporation does not have an
employer-employee relationship with the injured worker the theory
upon which immunity from suit was developed is absent. Thus, provid-
ing the parent corporation with immunity from suit would detour the
worker's compensation laws from their intended effect.
comb, 343 S.W.2d 838 (Ky. 1961); Mahan v. Litton, 321 S.W.2d 243 (Ky. 1959); Ky.
REv. STAT. § 342.004 (1978).
10. A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 72.50 at 14-95 (1976).
11. Mingin v. Continental Can Co., 171 N.J. Super. 148, 151, 408 A.2d 146, 148
(Law Div. 1979).
12. Including such commonly known conglomerates as General Motors, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph, Dupont, etc.
13. Boggs, 590 F.2d at 658 (citing Mingin, 171 N.J. Super. 148, 408 A.2d 146).
See also A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND 377-498 (1977).
14. Davis, Workmen's Compensation Using an Enterprise Theory of Employ-
ment to Determine Who is a Third Party Tortfeasor, 32 PITT. L. REV. 289, 294
(1971).
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Parent Corporations: Are They Separate Entities or Do They
Qualify as Employers?
There are several factors that any court must address in determin-
ing whether a parent corporation is entitled to claim immunity under
the Worker's Compensation Act. The United States District Court of
Tennessee identified many of these factors in Latham v. Technar, Inc.15
when it analyzed the relationship between the parent and subsidiary
corporation.
Although the stock ownership of one corporation by another may
serve in certain instances as an indicia of identity or commixture as
between the two, for the purpose of determining who may maintain
a common law action against a third party, it is not conclusive.
Likewise, the presence of a common insurer as between the holding
company and the wholly owned subsidiary does not automatically
establish a single employer unit, nor does identity of management
create identity for worker's compensation purposes.16
In Latham, the subsidiary held its own separate charter and filed sepa-
rate payroll withholding tax returns. Therefore, despite the interrela-
tions of the parent and subsidiary via stock ownership and a common
insurance policy, the court did not find the two corporations so com-
pletely integrated that they could not be viewed as separate entities.
The court further expressed that the parent corporation did not show
that it was an employer of the decedent. The individual who was origi-
nally hired and paid by the subsidiary corporation was transferred to
work in the parent company's adjacent operation without being trans-
ferred to a new payroll. Furthermore, she was not given notice that she
was working for the parent company. Based on these facts, the court
concluded that the individual was not an employee of the parent com-
pany. Therefore a common law suit could be maintained against the
15. 390 F. Supp. 1031 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
16. Latham, 390 F. Supp. at 1037. As support for the propositions stated in the
quoted language in text, the court cited the following cases among others: O'Brien v.
Grumman Corp., 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Thomas v. Hycon, Inc., 244 F.
Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965); Naranja Rock Co. v. Dawal Farms, 74 So. 2d 282 (Fla.
1954); Mingin v. Continental Can Co., 171 N.J. Super. 148, 408 A.2d 146 (Law Div.
1979); Brown v. Moorhead Oil Co., 239 S.C. 604, 124 S.E.2d 47 (1962).
6:1982 653[1Employee Tort Actions
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parent corporation'
In Thomas v. Hycon,1 7 a United States District Court addressed
the issue of when the parent corporation's connection to the subsidiary
would establish an "employer status." The court held it could not con-
sider the parent corporation (who was the employer in this case) and its
subsidiary (who was found to be a third party liable for damages due to
negligence) as a "single employer" for worker's compensation purposes.
This result was reached despite the existence of a joint worker's com-
pensation insurance policy because factors indicated the businesses
were separate entities; each maintained separate accounts; there was no
sharing of profits and losses; and there was no proof that the corpora-
tions had joint control over the employee's conduct.
Similarly in Mingin v. Continental Can Co.,18 a Superior Court of
New Jersey held that the presence of a common worker's compensation
policy was not sufficient to establish a "single employer" status and
thus no immunity could be granted from common law tort liability.
Therefore the plaintiff, a subsidiary's employee who was injured while
using a machine manufactured by another subsidiary, was not barred
from maintaining a tort action against the parent corporation. This was
notwithstanding the fact that the parent corporation and all subsidiar-
ies were covered by the same worker's compensation policy.
The same conclusion was reached by the United States District
Court in O'Brien v. Grumman Corp.19 The O'Brien court held that the
plaintiff was not barred from suing the parent corporation by Georgia's
worker's compensation statute "since that statute only bars an em-
ployee from suing his employer.""0 The court found that even though
the corporations were closely interrelated and were all covered by a
single worker's compensation policy, they were separate and distinct
corporations which could not be considered a single employer immu-
nized from common law tort liability. In reaching its decision the
O'Brien court acknowledged the contrary decision in Goldberg, but
stated that "[t]he majority of the courts which have confronted the
question have held that parent and subsidiary corporations must be
17. 244 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1965).
18. 171 N.J. Super. 171 N.J. Super. 148, 408 A.2d 146 (Law Div. 1979).
19. 475 F. Supp. 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
20. Id. at 291.
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treated as separate and distinct entities for the purposes of workmen's
compensation statutes."2
The parent corporations in Goldberg and Wilkerson also claimed
immunity from liability on the basis of joint worker's compensation in-
surance, close interrelations of the parent and subsidiary, as well as
ownership of the subsidiary's stock by the parent corporation. 22 In Wil-
kerson, however, the Florida Supreme Court did not find these factors
sufficient to override the fact that the corporations had been set up as
two separate legal entities. The Wilkerson court therefore held that a
parent corporation is not immune from suit by a subsidiary's employee
who has been injured. This was contrary to the Goldberg decision
which allowed the parent corporation to avoid the consequences of its
corporate structure by barring an independent tort action by the sub-
sidiary's employee.
It seems apparent from the case law of other jurisdictions that
courts generally do not favor extending the Worker's Compensation
Act provision of immunity from suit to parent corporations based upon
contentions such as those advanced in Goldberg.23
Florida: The Duty to Provide Worker's Compensation
The Florida Supreme Court in Jones v. Florida Power Corp.,24
determined that the basis for employer immunity from tort liability
rests upon
whether the Workmen's Compensation Act imposed upon the Cor-
poration the duty as an "employer" to secure compensation for
such employees. It is the liability to secure compensation which
gives the employer immunity from suit as a third party tort-feasor.
21. Id. at 292.
22. Brief for Appellee, Goldberg v. Context Indus., 362 So. 2d 974 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1978); Brief for Appellee, Wilkerson v. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp., 402
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
23. The court in Goldberg failed to recognize the parent and subsidiary corpora-
tions as separate entities. But see St. Petersburg Sheraton Corp. v. Stuart, 242 So. 2d
185 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970), where the court stated that a parent corporation's
ownership of all the stock of a subsidiary corporation does not erase the subsidiary's
identity as a separate legal entity.
24. 72 So. 2d 285 (Fla. 1954).
6551
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His immunity from suit is commensurate with his liability for se-
curing compensation-no more and no less.2 5
The Court's interpretation of sections 440.1026 and 440.1127 in
25. Id. at 287 (emphasis original).
26. FLA. STAT. § 440.10 (1979) states:
(1) Every employer coming within the provisions of this chapter, including
any brought within the chapter by waiver of exclusion or of exemption,
shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment to his employees, or any
physician, surgeon or pharmacist providing services under the provisions of
s. 440.13, of the compensation payable under ss. 440.13, 440.15, and
440.16. In case a contractor sublets any part or parts of his contract work
to a subcontractor or subcontractors, all of the employees of such contrac-
tor and subcontractor or subcontractors engaged on such contract work
shall be deemed to be employed in one and the same business or establish-
ment; and the contractor shall be liable for, and shall secure, the payment
of compensation to all such employees, except to employees of a subcon-
tractor who has secured such payment. A subcontractor is not liable for
the payment of compensation to the employees of another subcontractor on
such contract work and is not protected by the exclusiveness of liability
provisions of s. 440.11 from action at law or in admiralty on account of
injury of such employee of another subcontractor.
(2) Compensation shall be payable irrespective of fault as a cause for the
injury, except as provided in s. 440.09(3).
27. FLA. STAT. § 440.11(1) (1979) states:
(1) The liability of an employer prescribed in s. 440.10 shall be exclusive
and in place of all other liability of such employer to any third-party
tortfeasor and to the employee, the legal representative thereof, husband or
wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to
recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of
such injury or death, except that if an employer fails to secure payment of
compensation as required by this chapter, an injured employee, or the legal
representative thereof in case death results from the injury, may elect to
claim compensation under this chapter or to maintain an action at law or
in admiralty for damages on account of such injury or death. In such ac-
tion the defendant may not plead as a defense that the injury was caused
by negligence of a fellow servant, that the employee assumed the risk of
the employment, or that the injury was due to the comparative negligence
of the employee. The same immunities from liability enjoyed by an em-
ployer shall extend as well to each employee of the employer when such
employee is acting in furtherance of the employer's business and the in-
jured employee is entitled to receive benefits under this chapter. Such fel-
low-employee immunities shall not be applicable to an employee who acts,
1656 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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Florida's Worker's Compensation Statute clearly bases an employer's
immunity from suit on the legal obligation to furnish worker's compen-
sation. Absent an employer/employee relationship, no legal obligation
exists from which immunity can be derived.
The following analysis of section 440.04 must be viewed as an ad-
junct to, rather than a contradiction of, sections 440.10 and 440.11 as
interpreted in Jones. In Strickland v. Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc.,28
the Florida Supreme Court held the owner operator of a dump truck,
who was injured while cleaning his truck as required by the association
of truckers, 29 could recover worker's compensation benefits pursuant to
the provisions of section 440.0430 of the Florida Statutes, because the
with respect to a fellow employee, with willful and wanton disregard or
unprovoked physical aggression or with gross negligence when such acts
result in injury or death or such acts proximately cause such injury or
death, nor shall such immunities be applicable to employees of the same
employer when each is operating in the furtherance of the emlloyer's busi-
ness but they are assigned primarily to unrelated works within private or
public employment.
28. 170 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1964).
29. The association of truckers referred to was Al Landers Dump Trucks, Inc.
Members pay an entrance fee and monthly dues for the right to get on the working
line.
30. FLA. STAT. § 440.04 (1979) states:
(1) Every employer having in his employment any employee not included
in the definition "employee" or excluded or exempted from the operation
of this chapter may at any time waive such exclusion or exemption and
accept the provisions of this chapter as if such exclusion or exemption had
not been contained herein.
(2) When any policy or contract of insurance specifically secures the bene-
fits of this chapter to any person not included in the definition of "em-
ployee" or whose services are not included in the definition of "employ-
ment" or who is otherwise excluded or exempted from the operation of this
chapter, the acceptance of such policy or contract of insurance by the in-
sured and the writing of same by the carrier shall constitute a waiver of
such exclusion or exemption and an acceptance of the provisions, of this
chapter with respect to such person, notwithstanding the provision of s.
440.05 with respect to notice.
(3) A corporate officer who has exempted himself by proper notice from
the operation of this chapter may at any time revoke such exemption and
thereby accept the provisions of this chapter by giving notice as provided
in s. 440.05.
657 1
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association of truckers had "voluntarily caused a policy of workmen's
compensation insurance to be issued covering claimant."3' In carefully
reviewing section 440.04 it is apparent that the employer may waive its
exemption for those who do not qualify as an "employee"32 under the
31. 170 So. 2d at 447.
32. "Employee" is defined in FLA. STAT. § 440.02(2) (1979), which states:
(2) (a) The term "employee" means every person engaged in any employ-
ment under any appointment or contract of hire or apprenticeship, express
or implied, oral or written, including aliens and also including minors,
whether lawfully or unlawfully employed.
(b) The term "employee" includes any person who is an officer of a
corporation and who performs services for remuneration for such corpora-
tion within this state, whether or not such services are continuous. How-
ever, any officer of a corporation may elect to be exempt from coverage
under this chapter by filing written certification of the election with the
division as provided in s. 440.05. Services shall be presumed to have been
rendered the corporation in cases where such officer is compensated by
other than dividends upon shares of stock of such corporation owned by
him.
(c) The term "employee" includes a sole proprietor or a partner who
devotes full time to the proprietorship or partnership and elects to be in-
cluded in the definition of employee of filing notice thereof as provided in
s. 440.05.
(d) The term "employee" does not include:
1. An independent contractor, including:
a. An individual who agrees in writing to perform services for a per-
son or corporation without supervision or control as a real estate salesman
or agent, if such service by such individual for such person or corporation
is performed for remuneration solely by way of commission:
b. Bands, orchestras, and musical and theatrical performers, including
disk jockeys, performing in licensed premises as defined in chapter 562,
provided that a written contract evidencing an independent contractor re-
lationship is entered into prior to the commencement of such
entertainment;
2. A person whose employment is both casual and not in the course of
the trade, business, profession, or occupation of the employer; or
3. A volunteer who falls into one of the following categories:
a. Volunteers who serve in private nonprofit agencies and who receive
no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than or equivalent
to the standard mileage and per diem expenses provided to salaried em-
ployees in the same agency or, in the event that such agency does not have
salaried employees who receive mileage and per diem, then such volunteers
who receive no compensation other than expenses in an amount less than
10
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Worker's Compensation Act and provide worker's compensation cover-
age.33 The worker's compensation coverage in Strickland entitled the
employer to immunity from common law liability pursuant to section
440.11.
In Allen v. Estate of Carmen,34 the Florida Supreme Court again
interpreted section 440.04 to enable "an exempt employer to volunta-
rily assume the obligations and privileges of the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act and thereby insulate himself from common law liability...
.M5 The ruling involved the right of a an employer, who has only one
employee, to choose to assume limited liability by providing worker's
compensation insurance, even though he was under no obligation to do
so. The employer in Allen therefore was also entitled to invoke the de-
fense of immunity from common law liability.
The facts in Strickland and Allen indicate that the interpretation
of section 440.04 permitting the voluntary assumption of worker's com-
pensation is based on the existence of an actual employer-employee re-
lationship. Although the employer in Allen did not have the minimum
of. three employees for which worker's compensation is required, he
chose to cover his one employee. In Strickland, the owner-driver was a
member of the association of truckers which arranged his workload and
deducted from his salary its commission and a percentage for worker's
compensation and automobile insurance. The facts in Goldberg and
Wilkerson, however, are distinguishable because they fail to indicate a
viable employer-employee relationship with the insured. Therefore, to
broaden the application of section 440.04, from actual employers to
parent corporations as presented in Goldberg and Wilkerson, would be
an extension beyond the scope of that section.
or equivalent to the customary mileage and per diem paid to salaried
workers in the community as determined by the division.
b. Volunteers participating in federal programs established pursuant
to Pub. L. No. 93-113.
4. Any officer of a corporation who elects to be exempt from coverage
under this chapter.
33. The Florida Supreme Court held that Strickland was an independent con-
tractor rather than an employee of the association of truckers.
34. 281 So. 2d 317 (Fla. 1973).
35. 281 So. 2d at 322.
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Precedent: Goldberg or Other Jurisdictions?
Florida's Legislature has not expressly addressed the issue of par-
ent corporation immunity. The Goldberg decision, a brief per curiam
opinion without citation to any precedent or authority, shed little light
on the matter. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Wil-
kerson was compelled to look at case law from other jurisdictions.
Those persuasive opinions from other jurisdictions were appropriately
applied to the Florida statutes. It would have been injudicious for the
Supreme Court in Wilkerson to ignore this trend which militates
against parent corporation immunity since the wording of the Florida
Worker's Compensation Statute does not disclose the answer and the
contrary holding in Goldberg is unexplained. 36
Conclusion
The Florida Supreme Court wisely followed the trend established
by other jurisdictions. It found that a parent corporation is not immune
from a tort action by an injured subsidiary's employee who has col-
lected worker's compensation benefits on a policy issued jointly to the
parent and subsidiary corporation. The holding in Wilkerson deals
fairly with the intended effect of the Florida Worker's Compensation
Statute by refusing to grant protection to parent corporations. It up-
holds the principles upon which worker's compensation is based, as well
as considering the changes stemming from multi-unit enterprises.
Given the development of large conglomerates owning several di-
versified businesses, the legislature should modernize the worker's com-
pensation statutes. This would bring the Florida statute in accord with
the trend applied in Wilkerson so that it deals directly with the new
situations arising in the American economy. The legislature needs to
confront the issue of parent and subsidiary corporations and under
what circumstances, if any, worker's compensation laws should grant
immunity from common law tort liability to parent corporations.
It is suggested that a parent corporation could substantiate an em-
ployer-employee relationship and be entitled to immunity from suit by
demonstrating control of the employee's conduct, payment of the em-
36. Contra Brief for Appellee, Wilkerson v. Gulfstream Land & Dev. Corp., 402
So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
1660 Nova Law Journal 6:1982 1
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ployee's salary, and notification to the employee that it is his or her
employer. Absent proof of an actual employer-employee relationship
between the injured plaintiff and the parent corporation, the legislature
should treat the parent corporation as if it were a third party tort-
feasor.
Heddy Muransky
13
Muransky: Worker's Compensation and the Employee's Right to Maintain a Tort
Published by NSUWorks, 1982
